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INTERNATIONAL GENDER EQUALITY NORMS AND THEIR FRAGMENTED 
PROTECTION IN CONFLICT 
Catherine O’Rourke* 
 
ABSTRACT 
Normative and legal developments in the protection of gender equality in conflict have 
proliferated in recent decades across diverse regimes of public international law. 
Nevertheless, the ultimate impact of such international norms on domestic conflict-
affected settings is unclear. This article sets out to elucidate how international gender 
equality norms, underpinned by proliferating soft and hard legal sources, and 
implemented by separate institutions with widely varying powers of monitoring and 
enforcement, bring traction to women’s and girls’ rights in conflict-affected settings. 
While much discussion of fragmentation focuses on conflict between norms – and how 
to resolve such conflict within the non-hierarchical structure of international law – this 
article examines gender equality norms as they are operationalized by the institutions 
of international law charged with their monitoring and enforcement. International 
Relations literature suggests that, while international institutions are formally 
empowered through the consent and consensus of participating states, they in fact 
operate with considerable autonomy, due to their ‘expertise’ and consequent pedagogic 
function as ‘teachers’ of norms to states. The article investigates this thesis through the 
case study of the prohibition of sexual violence against girl soldiers in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, focusing on institutional activities under international 
humanitarian law, international criminal law and the United Nations Security Council. 
The case study reveals that the institutions of international law not only monitor and 
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enforce relevant gender equality norms, but they in fact give substance to often-vague 
international norms through their operational activities in conflict-affected settings, 
though not necessarily in a consistent or coherent manner. The article concludes that 
studying international institutions in their operational activities in conflict settings is 
essential to understanding the impact of international gender equality norms on 
women’s and girls’ experiences of conflict. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In international law, the language of ‘norms’ is common currency.1 It is a capacious 
term, intended to capture a spectrum from ‘rules’ (paradigmatically, these are legally 
binding obligations with a clear treaty basis) to ‘values’ or ‘principles’ (ideas about 
appropriate behaviour that have some basis within the increasingly diverse sources of 
international ‘soft law’).2  Norms are often discussed and categorised with reference to 
their legal status (‘binding’ or ‘non-binding’), 3  their compliance pull (‘weak’ or 
‘strong’),4 their underpinning sources (‘hard law’ or ‘soft law’)5 and also to their place 
in the ‘normative hierarchy’ of international law,6 with jus cogens, peremptory norms 
of international law, as the pinnacle of the hierarchy.  
Gender equality has been relatively prominent in post-Cold War international norm-
development. From women’s political participation and gender mainstreaming to the 
prohibition of violence against women and girls, gender equality claims find their basis 
across several international consensus documents and legal instruments. The generality 
of the term ‘norm’ means that what it captures is diverse, disparate and often ill-defined, 
with unclear boundaries and parameters. These blurred boundaries can be useful for 
                                                 
1 For an overview, see especially Shelton, D. (2001). Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-
Binding Norms in the International Legal System. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
2  For example, Koller, D. S. (2008). The Faith of the International Criminal Lawyer. New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics, 40(4), 1019-1070. 
3 Shelton (n 1). 
4  Charlesworth, H. (1998). The Unbearable Lightness of Customary International Law. American 
Society of International Law Proceedings, 92, 44. 
5 Chinkin, C. (1989). The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law. 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 38, 850-866. 
6 Shelton, D. (2006). Normative Hierarchy in International Law. American Journal of International Law, 
100(2), 291-323. 
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activists pushing for more expansive interpretations of a particular norm, such as 
initially bold claims about violence against women constituting torture.7 Likewise, 
however, vague norms carry potentially adverse effects, as the same norm being 
differently interpreted and actioned by different responsible institutions may lead to 
norm conflict. The precise contours of norms may vary as they manifest across different 
regimes of international law. 
The regulation of gender equality in conflict has travelled a great distance since initial 
feminist interventions into international law, which identified a ‘masculine world’ of 
international law reinforced by organisational and normative structures that excluded 
women from its practice and the lives of women and girls from its areas of concern.8 
States have agreed to limit the lawful conduct of armed conflict – including against 
female combatants and civilians – under international humanitarian law,9 and provided 
for international criminal jurisdiction over individuals bearing greatest responsibility 
for the most serious violations of these laws perpetrated against women and girls.10 The 
extent to which states can limit the human rights of women and girls, even in times of 
violent conflict, has been negotiated, litigated and interpreted in various instruments, 
consensus and interpretative documents grouped under international human rights 
law. 11  Meanwhile, United Nations Security Council responses to threats to 
international peace and security now recognise – and bring Security Council 
enforcement procedures – to the threat posed to women and girls by armed conflict.12 
Thus has arisen separate regime activity addressed to regulating women’s rights in 
conflict.   
                                                 
7 For an early feminist articulation of this argument, see MacKinnon, C. (1993). On Torture:  A Feminist 
Perspective on Human Rights. In K. Mahoney and P. Mahoney (Eds.), Human Rights in the Twenty-first 
Century:  A Global Perspective. Dordrecht and London: Martinus Nijhoff.  
8 Charlesworth, H., Chinkin, C., and Wright, S. (1991). Feminist Approaches to International Law. 
American Journal of International Law, 85, 613-645. 
9 For an overview, see Krill, F. (1985). The Protection of Women in International Humanitarian Law. 
International Review of the Red Cross, No. 249. 
10 Brammertz, S., and Jarvis, M. (Eds.). (2016). Prosecuting Conflict-Related Sexual Violence at the 
ICTY. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
11 See, for example, UN Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), ‘General Recommendation No. 30 on women in conflict prevention, conflict and post-
conflict situations’ (18 October 2013) UN Doc CEDAW/C/GC/30. 
12 United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, ‘Compendium of the High-Level Review of 
the United Nations Sanctions’ (New York 2015) UN Doc A/69/941-S/2015/432, 46. 
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The relevant laws and norms were developed at different times by different groups of 
states. They are motivated by divergent priorities and implemented by separate 
institutions with widely varying powers of monitoring and enforcement. The view of 
the International Law Commission is that such fragmentation ‘create[s] the danger of 
conflicting and incompatible rules, principles, rule-systems and institutional 
practices’. 13  The contemporary domain, with its tapestry of normative and legal 
commitments across regimes of international law, therefore posits a subtler and more 
complex set of challenges for feminist analysis than the traditional story of silence and 
exclusion. The article explores the ways in which international law, fragmented into 
regimes and applied by diverse institutions, regulates and brings scrutiny to the 
violation of international gender equality norms in armed conflict.  
While feminist analysis of international law has burgeoned across several regimes, 
specific feminist consideration of fragmentation per se has been notably sparser.14 This 
article sets out to elucidate how international gender equality norms, underpinned by 
proliferating soft and hard legal sources in a fragmented international legal system, 
bring traction to women’s and girls’ rights in conflict-affected settings. The article 
draws on International Relations and international legal scholarship of gender equality 
norms to posit international institutions as key actors. International Relations literature 
suggests that, while international institutions are formally empowered through the 
consent and consensus of participating states, international institutions in fact operate 
with considerable autonomy, due to their ‘expertise’ and consequent pedagogic 
function as ‘teachers’ of norms to states. The article investigates this thesis through the 
case study of the prohibition of sexual violence against girl soldiers in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC). The article finds that international institutions not only 
                                                 
13 International Law Commission, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law’ (13 April 2006) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682, paragraph 
14.  
14 Isolated examples include Heathcote, G. (2016). Fragmented Feminisms: Critical Feminist Thinking 
in the Post-Millennium Era. In A. Reinich (Ed.), International Law and…Select Proceedings of the 
European Society of International Law, Volume 5, 2014. Oxford: Hart Publishing; O'Rourke, C. (2017). 
Feminist Strategy in International Law: Understanding its Legal, Normative and Political Dimensions. 
European Journal of International Law, 28(4), 1019–1045; O'Rourke, C., and Swaine, A. (2018). 
CEDAW and the Security Council: Enhancing Women's Rights in Conflict. International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 67(1), 167–199; Ní Aoláin, F. (2012). International Law, Gender Regimes 
and Fragmentation: 1325 and Beyond. In C. M. Bailliet (Ed.), Non-State Actors, Soft Law and Protective 
Regimes: From the Margins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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monitor and enforce relevant gender equality norms, but they in fact give substance to 
often-vague international norms through their operational activities in conflict-affected 
settings, though not necessarily in a consistent or coherent manner. The article 
concludes that studying international institutions in their operational activities in 
conflict-settings is essential to understanding the impact of international gender 
equality norms on women’s and girls’ experiences of conflict.  
 
WHY DO INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTITUTIONS MATTER? TWO 
STORIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  
A diverse body of scholarship attempts to address the question of how international 
laws and norms impact domestic conflict-affected settings. Very broadly, a distinction 
can be drawn within this literature between an emphasis on international law as a set of 
rules with which states comply, or as a set of norms into which states are socialised.  
 
Story One:  A Set of Rules with which States Must Comply 
There is active debate amongst feminist internationalists about what international law 
stands for.15 Some read international law principally as a set of rules to which states 
commit and with which states must comply. At last, it seems, after decades of neglect, 
there is a clear body of treaty law, jurisprudence, Security Council resolutions and soft 
law for a principle that women’s rights and equality must be protected by states, 
including in the specific context of armed conflict. It points to a way around the 
problems of recalcitrant or regressive states, who must now, according to international 
law, respect and advance women’s rights in conflict.  
Doctrinal developments on women’s rights in armed conflict have arguably been most 
concerted in the area of broadening and deepening definitions of harm. Thus, the 
thematic issue of women’s rights in conflict first entered the international domain as a 
subsidiary issue of the global problem of violence against women. The normative 
traction of the issue in the immediate post-Cold War years was most pronounced within 
                                                 
15 On feminist internationalism and international law, see generally Charlesworth, H. (2000). Martha 
Nussbaum's Feminist Internationalism. Ethics, 1111, 64-78. 
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the international human rights system. In 1992, the CEDAW Committee adopted its 
landmark General Recommendation Number 19, addressing violence against women 
as a violation of women’s human rights.16 In 1993, violence against women emerged 
as the central policy concern of the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights.17 The 
appointment of a Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women by the Commission 
on Human Rights in 1994 consolidated these earlier developments to firmly establish 
ending violence against women as a human rights priority.18 Importantly, while these 
developments did not principally concern violence against women in conflict-settings, 
each included reference to specific manifestations of violence against women in 
conflict.19  
Developments under international human rights law formed the crucial backdrop to the 
recognition of gender crimes under the nascent canon of international criminal law in 
the 1990s.20 An important milestone in the international community’s awareness of the 
gender-specific impact of conflict on women is found in the Report of the Commission 
of Experts established by the UN Security Council to document war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and evidence of genocide occurring in the former Yugoslavia,21 that 
ultimately led to the Security Council’s establishment of the International Criminal 
Tribunal of former Yugoslavia.22 Both the scale and prominence of rape and sexual 
violence in the Report brought unprecedented international attention to the 
phenomenon, as well as an emergent focus (which has endured) on ending impunity for 
such violence. The ad hoc tribunals established by the Security Council to prosecute 
                                                 
16 UN Committee for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 
‘General Recommendation No. 19 on violence against women’ (1992)  UN Doc. A/47/38. 
17 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, Adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights 
in Vienna on 25 June 1993, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23, paragraph 38. 
18 United Nations Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 1994/45 to appoint a Special Rapporteur 
on violence against women, including its causes and consequences, adopted on 4 March 1994. 
19 For example, ibid, paragraph 3.  
20 ‘Recent steps within the international community to ensure that women's rights are recognised as 
human rights and to enhance the accountability of governments for violence against women are as much 
an integral part of the overall counter-attack on the war against women as are the more publicised and 
dramatic responses to events in the former Yugoslavia.’ Chinkin, C. (1994). Rape and Sexual Abuse of 
Women in International Law. European Journal of International Law, 5, 326-341, 341. 
21 Final Report of the Commission Of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 
(1992) UN Doc. S/1994/674. 
22 United Nations Security Council Resolution 827 (1993).  
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international crimes perpetrated in conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
produced a series of landmark cases recognising sexual- and gender-based offences as 
constitutive of the most egregious crimes under international criminal law.23 This focus 
on ending impunity achieved its legal high watermark with documented feminist 
successes in the criminalization of sexual and gender-based violence throughout the 
1998 Rome Statute.24 
Developments led by the UN General Assembly proved critical to broadening the 
emergent focus from violence against women in armed conflict to the more expansive 
thematic area of women’s rights in armed conflict. The Fourth World Conference on 
Women and the resulting Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action convened by the 
General Assembly in 1995 was a critically important milestone. One of the twelve 
identified ‘critical areas of concern’ to emerge as consensus areas of priority for the 
Beijing Platform for Action was ‘women and armed conflict’. 25 Thus, the Beijing 
Platform for Action addressed the relationship between peace, development and 
women’s rights,26 and the harmful impact of military spending and the arms trade in 
diverting resources away from development.27 It identified the impact of conflict in 
increasing the caring burden on women as caretakers of children and the elderly,28 in 
addition to ‘the lifelong social, economic and psychologically traumatic consequences 
of armed conflict, foreign occupation and alien domination’.29 Beijing was also critical 
in establishing women’s participation in decision-making, including in issues of 
conflict prevention, management and resolution, as essential to achieving gender 
equality.30 Indeed, the key strategic objective emerging from the women and armed 
conflict ‘critical area of concern’ in the Beijing Platform for Action was to ‘[i]ncrease 
                                                 
23 See further Brammertz and Jarvis (n 10). 
24 See further Bedont, B., and Hall Martinez, K. (1999). Ending Impunity for Gender Crimes under the 
International Criminal Court. The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 6(1), 65-85. 
25 Beijing Platform for Action (15 September 1995) UN Doc. A/CONF.177/20 Annex II, Chapter 4, 
paragraphs 131-149.  
26 Ibid, paragraph 131. 
27 Ibid, paragraphs 13 and 138.  
28 Ibid, paragraph 133. 
29 Ibid, paragraph 135.  
30 Ibid, paragraph 13. For a critical account of the focus on participation at Beijing, see Otto, D. (1996). 
Holding Up Half the Sky But for Whose Benefit? A Critical Analysis of the Fourth World Conference 
on Women. Australian Feminist Law Journal, 6, 7. 
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the participation of women in conflict resolution at decision-making levels and protect 
women living in situations of armed and other conflicts or under foreign occupation’.31 
The emphasis on women’s participation in conflict prevention, management and 
resolution gathered significant further traction in the aftermath of the Beijing 
Conference, ultimately leading to the adoption of landmark Security Council 
Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS). The emphasis on participation 
is importantly understood as twofold: firstly, that exclusion from relevant decision-
making and programing was of itself a violation of women’s rights in conflict; and 
secondly, that women’s participation could inform more effective conflict resolution, 
peacebuilding and enduring conflict-prevention. Thus, the identification of the 
exclusion of women from decision-making as a negative gendered cause and 
consequence of conflict has been important in informing the international community’s 
understanding of the gendered effects of conflict. Resolution 1325 addresses the need 
for the protection of women from gender-specific effects of conflict, the need for the 
integration of a gender perspective throughout conflict prevention, management and 
peacebuilding and the need to address women’s gender-specific needs throughout relief 
and recovery activities.32  
International humanitarian law, also, was influenced by this busy period of norm 
development and thematic activity concerning women’s rights in armed conflict. In 
2001, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) published its landmark 
Women Facing War Report. This was the first sustained and systematic documentation 
of the routine violations of women’s rights under international humanitarian law, in 
particular civilian women.33 The Report involved fine-grained analysis of the impact 
of conflict on women, informed by ICRC country missions, on women’s personal safety 
and freedom of movement,34 women’s access to food and water and to the means for 
                                                 
31 Beijing Platform for Action (n 25), Chapter 4, paragraph 141.  
32 UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000).  
33 International Committee of the Red Cross. (2001). Women Facing War: ICRC Study on the Impact of 
Armed Conflict on Women. Geneva: ICRC.  
34 Ibid, 42-75. 
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safe food preparation, 35 sources of livelihood 36 and shelter, 37 access to health and 
healthcare, including basic standards of hygiene and sanitation, 38  education and 
information,39 and the impact on the maintenance of the family unit.40 In addition to 
the impact on civilian women, the Report addressed the particular humanitarian needs 
and entitlements of women detained and interned during conflict, addressing issues 
such as housing, security, food and water, healthcare and sanitation, and maintaining 
family links while in detention. Overall, these interventions were intended to improve 
operational responses to violations of international humanitarian law experienced by 
women. 
It is important to note that this apparent ‘progress narrative’ 41  of incremental 
improvements in the protections afforded to women’s rights under international law has 
been subject also to considerable critique from feminist doctrinalists. Principally, 
feminist international lawyers – or formalists42 – have focused their critique on the soft 
law and consequently weak legal status of many affirmations of women’s rights in 
armed conflict. Such affirmations typically emerge at greater distance from state 
consent, with a likely negative impact on compliance.43 Secondly, the proliferating 
nature of legal developments on women’s rights in conflict, emerging from distinct 
regimes with varying state parties and diverse enforcement bodies, replicate the same 
problems generated by fragmentation on other themes and issues under international 
law.  There is the risk of creating a permissive environment in which states selectively 
comply only with those laws that most closely align to their existing interests and 
                                                 
35 Ibid, 76-92. 
36 Ibid, 93-101. 
37 Ibid, 102-109. 
38 Ibid, 110-123. 
39 Ibid, 136-140. 
40 Ibid, 124-135. 
41 Mullally, S. (2011). Domestic Violence Asylum Claims and Recent Developments in International 
Human Rights Law: A Progress Narrative? International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 60(2), 459-
484. 
42 O'Rourke (n 14). 
43 Charlesworth (n 4), 44.  
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preferences. 44  Further, there is evidence of states exploiting fragmentation to 
deliberately pursue and exploit strategically-created treaty conflicts.45  
Thirdly, the broad problems of under-enforcement of women’s rights under 
international law, which manifests emblematically in widespread reservations to the 
CEDAW Convention, have been replicated rather than resolved by normative and legal 
developments on women’s rights in conflict. The concern is clearly linked to questions 
of legal capture and legal status. Different norms and obligations, emerging from 
different parts of the international system will empower different actors and agents in 
their monitoring and enforcement. Typically, the most progressive articulations of 
women’s rights will not align with the institution most empowered to meaningfully 
pursue enforcement of women’s rights. Understanding international law as a system of 
rules with which states must comply reveals, therefore, important legal and normative 
development on women’s rights in conflict, while nevertheless identifying significant 
shortcomings also to the system of rules.  
 
Story Two: A Set of Norms to which States are Socialised  
The concern of formalists with the legal capture and status of feminist-informed 
developments in international law reflects the disciplinary commitments of legal 
scholars. Other disciplinary perspectives, however, also weigh into the debate. For 
example, scholars of International Relations have attended to international law as a set 
of ‘standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations,’ 46  more 
commonly known as norms. Study of the emergence of a ‘global gender equality 
regime’ identifies the existence of explicit rules of gender equality in international 
treaties, the practice of state compliance to those rules, and evidence of a shared 
                                                 
44 Chinkin (n 5). 
45 Ranganathan, S. (2014). Strategically Created Treaty Conflicts and the Politics of International Law. 
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
46  Kardam, N. (2004). The Emerging Global Gender Equality Regime from Neoliberal and 
Constructivist Perspectives in International Relations. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 6(1), 
85-109, 87. 
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understanding amongst states of women’s rights as human rights, as conclusive 
evidence of the existence of a ‘global gender equality regime’.47   
International Relations scholarship is typically concerned with the origins of norms; the 
mechanisms by which they diffuse; and finally, the conditions under which norms will 
be influential in world politics. 48  Feminists have entered this conversation most 
concertedly in terms of the first question and the role of women’s movements in 
generating new norms of gender equality and women’s (human) rights. Work on 
transnational advocacy networks (TANs) typically identifies the transnational women’s 
movement that targeted the UN as a key site for establishing norms and mobilised for 
formal recognition of women’s rights as human rights as paradigmatic of non-state 
actors, social movements, generating new norms.49 The Security Council’s adoption of 
Resolution 1325 (2000) due to civil society advocacy exemplifies women’s movement 
activity to generate new gender equality norms.50 
The prominence and perceived success of feminist TANs in this norm generation and 
diffusion has highlighted the importance of ‘soft law’ forums in providing a platform 
for the generation of norms. To illustrate, in terms of norm diffusion, United Nations 
agencies and conferences have been key in the production of an international consensus 
on women’s human rights. Indeed, as Kardam notes, ‘the chronologies of the 
international women's movement are largely a collection of UN meetings: Mexico, 
Copenhagen, Nairobi, Vienna, Cairo, Beijing’.51 
Importantly for the protection of women’s rights in armed conflict under international 
law, the literature from international relations reveals that the role and influence of 
TANs is not uniform across all issue-areas. For example, foundational research by Keck 
and Sikkink that examines comparatively the transnational movements against slavery, 
against violence against women and against environmental pollution found that certain 
                                                 
47 Ibid.  
48  Finnemore, M., and Sikkink, K. (1998). International Norms Dynamics and Political Change. 
International Organization, 52(4), 887-917, 888. 
49 Keck, M. E., and Sikkink, K. (1998). Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International 
Politics. London and Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 165-98. 
50 Cockburn, C. (2007). From Where We Stand. London: Zed Books; Anderlini, S. (2007). Women 
Building Peace: What They Do, Why it Matters. Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Reinner.  
51 Kardam (n 46), 87.  
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intrinsic characteristics of the given norm determine its diffusion potential. 52 
Specifically, they found that issues involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals, 
especially when there is a short and clear causal chain (or story) assigning 
responsibility, most effectively underpinned TAN activity.53 This finding immediately 
indicates why the perpetration of sexual violence in armed conflict might more 
effectively motivate TAN activity and norm-development than, for example, economic 
and social rights.  
Likewise, Finnemore and Sikkink found that the relationship of new normative claims 
to existing norms might also influence the likeliness of their influence on global politics 
and state behaviour. 54 They advanced a thesis based on the so-called ‘adjacency’ of 
claims. Where new norms are broadly consistent with existing ones, the likelihood of 
diffusion is considerably higher. This insight is particularly useful in explaining the 
evolution of TAN activity and norm development documented above, from a focus on 
violence against women per se to more specific dedicated activity on sexual violence 
in armed conflict. The ‘adjacency’ of both is clear. The question of adjacency is also 
useful in explaining why, for example, food security has not had the same diffusion 
success. 
Two important insights have arisen from more recent work on TAN activity and norm-
generation, taking place since the more consensual international politics of the 1990s 
expired. The first of these important contemporary insights is the conflictual nature of 
norm substance and ownership. Rather than focusing on a single movement or network, 
and their efforts to advance (generally progressive) norms, Clifford Bob for example 
focuses instead on ‘the clash’ between advocacy networks and their adversaries, who 
also form networks.55 Rather than assuming that they have little impact and that civil 
society speaks with one voice against state and corporate destruction, his analysis rests 
on the premise that advocacy in the international space is characterised by conflict. 
With regard to international law: 
                                                 
52 Keck and Sikkink (n 49), 165-98. 
53 Ibid, 27. 
54 Finnemore and Sikkink (n 48), 908.  
55 Bob, C. (2012). The Global Right Wing and the Clash of World Politics. Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 17. 
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To challenge a detested norm’s proclaimed emergence, rivals use submergence 
strategies. They attack purported soft laws, arguing that proponents highlighted 
favourable precedents while ignoring inconvenient ones. More belligerently, 
they invent incompatible norms, using tactics mirroring their foes’; their own 
conference declarations, quasi-judicial rulings, joint statements, expert 
opinions, and law review articles.56 
Debates surrounding the language of ‘gender’ in the Rome Statute establishing the 
International Criminal Court provide a good example of such conflict in international 
norm-development.57 While some states favoured inclusive language of ‘gender’ in the 
Statute, others feared that such language would attribute recognition to sexual 
minorities and to ideas of gender as pluralist and fluid that surpassed their domestic 
law. 58  The disagreement ultimately led a ‘constructively ambiguous’ definition of 
gender that attempted to incorporate understandings of gender both as fixed and 
biological and as fluid and socially constructed.59 
Complementary insights emerge from the work of Krook and True, namely the dynamic 
nature of norms.60 Whereas much norm-diffusion literature tends to assume the static 
substance of norms, comparative research on the differing fates of gender 
mainstreaming and gender quotas norms reveals their very different trajectories. 
Ultimately, Krook and True found, norms evolve in response to two important factors: 
firstly, to international debate over meaning, (as illustrated in the example of defining 
‘gender’ in the Rome Statute); secondly, in interaction with their external normative 
environment.61 This latter finding reinforces the earlier adjacency thesis of Finnemore 
and Sikkink, in which new norms that are broadly consistent and connected to existing 
                                                 
56 Ibid, 31. 
57 See further Bedont and Hall Martinez (n 24); Oosterveld, V. (2014). Constructive Ambiguity and the 
Meaning of ‘Gender’ for the International Criminal Court. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 
16(4), 563-580.  
58 Anderson, K. (2000). The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of International Non-
governmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society. European Journal of 
International Law, 11(1), 91-120. 
59 Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) (17 July 1998) UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 
[hereafter Rome Statute], article 7(3): ‘For the purpose of this Statute, it is understood that the term 
“gender” refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of society. The term “gender” does 
not indicate any meaning different from the above.’ 
60 Krook, M. L., and True, J. (2012). Rethinking the Life Cycles of International Norms: The United 
Nations and the Global Promotion of Gender Equality. European Journal of International Relations, 18, 
103-127. 
61 Ibid.  
O’Rourke  International Gender Equality Norms 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
14 
 
norms will be most successful in diffusing and ultimately influencing state behaviour. 
Of particular importance to gender equality actors is the clear finding that not all actors 
have equal voice in the contestation over meaning and in determining the external 
normative environment.62 States are privileged actors in the negotiation of international 
treaty texts and the norms therein. There are hierarchies of influence amongst states. 
Likewise, well-resourced non-governmental actors of the global north are likely to have 
greater influence.63 
On the whole, this literature has concluded broadly positively about the role of women’s 
movements – not just in consuming or formally engaging with international law through 
prescribed avenues – but in generating, altering and diffusing such norms. This broadly 
positive assessment is important for understanding continued feminist engagement with 
international law, even in less propitious times.   
 
THE SHARED STORY? INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND GENDER 
EQUALITY NORMS 
What unifies these ostensibly quite different ‘stories’ of international law and its 
relationship to the domestic sphere is the agreed importance of the institutions of 
international law to both stories. Both are agreed that multilateral institutions made up 
of states, authorised and empowered to act on a supranational basis on particular 
specialised areas and interests, are significant for making international laws and norms 
impact on the ground, including within conflict-affected settings. The phenomenon 
explored here has traditionally been explained in terms of the legitimacy conferred on 
a state’s policy by the approval of institutions of international law, which leads to 
greater international support. Countless scholars and policymakers have pointed to the 
‘legitimation function’ of international institutions, especially the UN.64 More finely-
grained research on how this legitimation function is performed – or withheld – in 
                                                 
62  Carpenter, C. (2007). Studying Issue (Non)-Adoption in Transnational Advocacy Networks. 
International Organization, 61(3), 643-667. 
63 Anderson (n 58). 
64  See, for example, Finnemore, M. (1996). Norms, Culture, and World Politics: Insights from 
Sociology's Institutionalism. International Organization, 50(2), 325-347. 
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practice has also revealed a potentially important role for civil society, in particular in 
respect of international human rights law.  
Literature focused on the relationship between social mobilisation and state compliance 
has emphasised the interaction between international institutions and domestic civil 
society. Foundational in this field is the idea of the ‘boomerang pattern’ first advanced 
by Keck and Sikkink in 1998. According to this typology, civil society organised 
transnationally in order to influence international organisations, which in turn placed 
pressure back on domestic governments.65 In line with this comparative qualitative 
work of social constructivist scholars in international relations, quantitative political 
scientists have also scrutinised causal mechanisms between international human rights 
norms and domestic state behaviour. In particular, the pathbreaking work of Beth 
Simmons on why states comply with international human rights treaties also points to 
the relationship between international institutions and domestic civil society as 
determinative. According to Simmons’ large-N study, ratification of a human rights 
treaty leads to improved human rights performance by ratifying states because treaty 
ratification empowers domestic reform constituencies to press for rule-complaint 
behaviour.66 Thus, a critical conceptual and practical link between international gender 
equality norms relating to women and conflict and domestic peacemaking is the role of 
international institutions.  
 
Autonomy of International Institutions 
Importantly, research suggests that institutions of international law, although formally 
constituted by states, in fact operate with considerable autonomy from states.67 Boyle 
and Chinkin consider the role of specialised institutions within the United Nations, such 
                                                 
65 Keck and Sikkink (n 49), 12. Subsequent work sought to clarify and refine the modalities and 
causalities of this ‘boomerang pattern’. Most notably in relation to international human rights law, 
Sikkink and colleagues came to propose the ‘spiral model’ of influence from international norms and 
organisations to eventually rule-consistent behaviour. Risse, T., and Sikkink, K. (1999). The 
Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practice: Introduction. In T. Risse, K. 
Sikkink, and S. C. Ropp (Eds.), The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
66  Simmons, B. (2009). Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics. 
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
67  Barnett, M., and Finnemore, M. (1999). The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International 
Organizations. International Organisation, 53, 699-732. 
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as the UN Environmental Programme or the UN Development Programme. These 
bodies are institutions with a commitment to promote the relevant objectives of the UN 
Charter.68 These institutions have built up an expertise in their special fields of law, 
while at the same time operating through finely tuned political processes. They draw 
upon experience derived from compliance monitoring and reporting procedures. They 
are thereby empowered by international treaty, but operate with considerable autonomy 
from state parties.  
Further, the evidence suggests that increasing specialisation of international law, in 
which increasingly bespoke norms are developed, monitored (and potentially enforced) 
by increasingly specialised institutions in turn reinforces their autonomy in their 
respective issue-areas.69 The autonomy of international institutions is grounded in their 
control of expertise. 
 
Control of Expertise 
International relations literature explains institutional autonomy in terms of 
bureaucratic control of expertise:  
[One] basis of autonomy and authority…is bureaucratic control over 
information and expertise. A bureaucracy's autonomy derives from specialised 
technical knowledge, training, and experience that is not immediately available 
to other actors. While such knowledge might help the bureaucracy carry out the 
directives of politicians more efficiently, Weber stressed that it also gives 
bureaucracies power over politicians (and other actors). It invites and at times 
requires bureaucracies to shape policy, not just implement it.70 
International lawyers, including the International Law Commission, might explain this 
dynamic instead in terms of ‘structural bias’, whereby international organisations 
interpret authorising instruments – including conflicts between different international 
treaties and norms – in a manner that most empowers that institution.71 International 
                                                 
68 Boyle, A., and Chinkin, C. (2007). The Making of International Law. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 123.  
69  Pauwelyn, J. (2004). Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as a Universe of Inter-
Connected Islands. Michigan Journal of International Law, 25, 903-916, 904 
70 Ibid, 709.  
71 International Law Commission (n 13), 282. The resulting interpretative openness creates a danger of 
‘structural bias’ - namely that what is understood as a ‘mutually supportive’ solution is determined in 
accordance with the priorities of the body whose task it is to interpret the conflict clause.  
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relations and international legal scholars are largely agreed, therefore, that while 
constituted and authorised by participating member states, international organisations 
in fact operate in ways that are autonomous and aggregate further power to themselves.  
To illustrate, growing emphasis on ‘gender expertise’ is evidenced, for example, by the 
Women, Peace and Security (WPS) Resolutions of the United Nations Security 
Council, the dominant international framework for responding to gendered needs in 
armed conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. The resolutions make repeated 
reference to the importance of gender expertise throughout relevant peace and security 
programming. They emphasise gender training (Resolution 1889, paragraph 4), 
welcome expert initiatives (Resolution 1888, Preamble), provide for additional 
personnel and bespoke offices with the requisite expertise (such as a team of experts in 
sexual violence in armed conflict) (Resolution 1888, paragraph 8), provide for women’s 
protection advisers and gender advisers (Resolution 1888, paragraph 7), as well as 
strengthening national gender expertise (Resolution 1889, paragraphs 7–8).  
The emphasis on expertise raises important questions about the mechanisms of 
accountability for these ‘experts’: to whom are they accountable? Certainly, the 
relationship to state parties seems tenuous, at best. We tend to regard experts as 
implementers, as ‘doers’, who bring political decisions to life. International experts 
operate ostensibly without discretion, driven by ‘facts-on-the-ground’, ‘empirical 
realities’, and ‘best practice’. 72  Increasing scrutiny of international ‘expertise’ 
highlights the assumed apolitical character of the growing place of expertise in global 
governance.73 There is evidence of similar dynamics in feminist approaches to the WPS 
agenda. While attention, and critique, is concentrated on the avowedly political 
deliberations of UN summits, international conferences and UN Security Council 
Resolutions, insufficient attention is paid to the manifold ways in which ‘expertise’ 
shapes political understandings of social problems and the range of responses 
considered.74 Expert individuals and units are supposedly there to ensure the translation 
of (settled and predetermined) international norms into policy implementation. The 
                                                 
72 Kennedy, D. (2005). Challenging Expert Rule: The Politics of Global Governance. Sydney Law 
Review, 27(1), 1. 
73 Ibid, 21. 
74 Ibid, 17. 
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emphasis on ‘expertise’ obscures contestation over the content of international norms 
and reaffirms institutional autonomy.75 
 
International Institutions as ‘Teachers of Norms’ 
The autonomy of international institutions becomes important from a norm-perspective 
when they become engaged in ‘teaching’ gender equality norms. To illustrate, linked 
to their role as ‘experts’, international institutions play important roles in ‘teaching’ 
states about the substance and implementation of particular norms. One might consider 
the role of gender advisors in UN Security Council (UNSC) country missions in 
supporting states to develop National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security, or 
the CEDAW Committee in its iterative interactions with states over the nature, 
substance and compliance with treaty obligations under the Convention. 76  The 
pedagogic activity of international institutions links also to their role in potentially 
accelerating norm diffusion.77  
According to Finnemore and Sikkink, international actors encourage others to adhere 
to new norms through a process of socialisation and peer pressure that combines 
discursive strategies of praise for appropriate behaviour and denunciation for violation 
of norms. Further, these discursive strategies are accompanied by material strategies of 
rewards for good behaviour and sanctions against those who do not adhere to the 
relevant norms.78 Whereas this ‘socialisation’ perspective on international behaviour 
continues to privilege states as key agents, a growing body of work on the autonomy of 
international institutions suggests they may, in fact, be key actors in gender equality 
norm-diffusion. In practice, international institutions are key agents of both discursive 
and material strategies. Thus, international relations and international law arrive at 
largely compatible conclusions on the important role of international institutions in 
operationalizing international norms, and making them matter on the ground in conflict-
                                                 
75 Squires, J. (2007). The New Politics of Gender Equality. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 14-15. 
76 O’Rourke and Swaine (n 14).  
77 Finnemore and Sikkink (n 48). 
78 Ibid, 910.  
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affected states. The theoretical literature proposes a number of hypotheses that merit 
empirical case study investigation, to which the next section turns.  
 
INTERNATIONAL NORMS PROHIBITING SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST 
CIVILIANS AND THE RECRUITMENT AND USE OF CHILD SOLDIERS  
The article investigates the role of international institutions through a focus on 
institutional activity on the prohibition of sexual violence against girl soldiers in the 
DRC. The case study has been selected for a number of reasons. First, the issues both 
of sexual violence against civilians in armed conflict and the recruitment and use of 
child soldiers have been the subject of concerted treaty-based and soft law development 
in international law. Notably, both issues conform with the ‘intrinsic characteristics’ 
identified by Keck and Sikkink that lend themselves to norm diffusion, namely bodily 
harm to vulnerable individuals, with a relatively short and clear causal chain assigning 
responsibility. Thus, institutional activity on the issues across a range of international 
institutions is evident in the DRC.  
In terms of the article’s theoretical contribution, there is great and growing feminist 
concern at the relative prominence of sexual violence in international law’s 
understanding of – and response to – violations of women’s rights in conflict. Concerns 
might be summarised as: the privileging of protective stereotypes of women;79 the 
general failure to reveal and vindicate women’s agency; 80  and the abstraction of 
incidents of sexual violence from their context of structural gender inequality that both 
precede and survive conflict.81 These concerns have prompted considerable reflection 
and critique on the value of ostensible feminist ‘successes’ in international law.82  
                                                 
79  See, for example, Otto, D. (2009). The Exile of Inclusion: Reflections on Gender Issues in 
International Law over the Last Decade. Melbourne Journal of International Law, 10, 11. 
80  See, for example, Mertus, J. (2004). Shouting from the Bottom of the Well: The Impact of 
International Trials for Wartime Rape on Women's Agency. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 
6(1), 110-129. 
81  See, for example, Swaine, A. (2018). Conflict-related Violence Against Women: Transforming 
Transition. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
82 For a typology of these concerns, see O'Rourke, C. (2013). International Law and Domestic Gender 
Justice: Why Case Studies Matter. In M. Fineman and E. Zinstag (Eds.), Feminist Perspectives on 
Transitional Justice. Antwerp: Intersentia. 
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Further, scholars such as Augustine Park have criticised the tendency to make girls 
‘invisible’ in international law through the dominance of women’s rights or child rights 
frameworks.83 For example, there is much criticism that the international norm against 
the recruitment and use of child soldiers in fact assumes a male victim and thus has 
been normatively blind to girls.84 Notwithstanding this criticism, there is established 
practice under international law of addressing the rights and lives of girls within the 
broader framework of women’s rights. This practice is evidenced most clearly in the 
CEDAW Convention. To quote the CEDAW Commentary:  
Although it does not spell out that “woman” includes girls under the age of 
Eighteen (as does for example, the Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa), 
this is evidently the case… Many of the concerns addressed in the Convention, 
such as trafficking, marriage, health, exploitation, and violence have immediate 
and important consequences for girls… The Committee refers readily to girls 
(or children) and requires that States parties pay particular ‘attention to the 
specific needs of (adolescent) girls’.85 
Further evidence is found in the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action emerging 
from the UN’s Fourth World Conference on Women, which addresses throughout 
‘women and girls’.86 Likewise, the programme of work of the UN Commission on the 
Status of Women addresses the unequal position of women and girls.87 
The author acknowledges and shares these important concerns at both the prominence 
of sexual violence and inattention to the specificity of girls’ lives in international legal 
responses to gender dynamics of conflict. Ultimately, the article seeks – through case 
study analysis of international institutional activity on sexual violence against girl 
soldiers in conflict – to provide valuable new evidence as to practical implications of 
proliferating legal developments.    
                                                 
83 Park, A. (2006). ‘Other Inhumane Acts’: Forced Marriage, Girl Soldiers and the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone. Social and Legal Studies, 15(3), 315-337, 323.  
84 Tonheim, M. (2010). Where are the Research Gaps? Reviewing Literature on Former Child Soldiers’ 
Reintegration in the African Context. In B. Maeland (Ed.), Culture, Religion, and the Reintegration of 
Female Child Soldiers in Northern Uganda. New York: Peter Lang. 
85 Freeman, M. A., Chinkin, C., and Rudolf, B. (2012). The UN Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women: A Commentary. Oxford and New York: Oxford University 
Press, 14 [footnotes omitted]. 
86 Beijing Platform for Action (n 25) passim.  
87 See, for example, its 2010-2019 agenda, which includes înter alia violence against women and girls; 
rural women and girls; social protection for women and girls; http://www.unwomen.org/en/csw  
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The Prohibition of the Recruitment and Use of Child Soldiers 
The prohibition of the recruitment and use of child soldiers is clearly established under 
international humanitarian law, international criminal law and international human 
rights law. International humanitarian law (IHL) prohibits the recruitment as well as 
the participation of children in hostilities under Additional Protocols (APs) I and II.88 
This prohibition now constitutes customary IHL.89 Further, the Rome Statute makes 
explicit the prohibition of the recruitment and use of child soldiers in international90 
and non-international91 armed conflicts under international criminal law. In addition, 
the Security Council has developed a considerable body of thematic activity on children 
and armed conflict contributing inter alia to the recognition of the recruitment and use 
of child soldiers as a threat to international peace and security. Most significantly, 
Security Council Resolution 1539 requests the Secretary-General to annex to his annual 
reporting on children and armed conflict a list of parties that recruit or use children in 
violation of the international obligations applicable to them.92 This listing can underpin 
inter alia the Security Council imposition of sanctions.93 
Despite the consistency of the prohibition of the recruitment and use of child soldiers, 
there are considerable and legitimate questions about the extent to which this 
prohibition captures the most common activities of girl soldiers, given the heavily 
                                                 
88 API requires parties to international conflicts to take ‘all feasible measures’ to ensure that children 
under fifteen years of age do not take a direct part in hostilities nor be recruited into the armed forces. 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (API) (8 June 1977) 1125 UNTS 3, article 77(2). APII 
specifically forbids the recruitment and participation of children under the age of fifteen in non-
international armed conflicts. ‘[C]hildren who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be 
recruited in the armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities.’ Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts (APII) (8 June 1977) 1125 UNTS 609, article 4(3)(c).  
89 See further also International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian 
Law, Rule 156. Recruitment of child soldiers. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule136  
90 Rome Statute (n 59), article 8(2)(b)(xxvi). 
91 Rome Statute (n 59), article 8(2)(e)(vii).  
92 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1539 (2004), paragraph 16. 
93 Ibid.  
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gendered forms of child participation in armed groups. 94  For the purpose of 
understanding the regulatory legal framework, there are four pertinent types of child 
soldier activities and these are differently regulated under the different regimes. The 
categories of activities are (1) direct participation in combat and active military 
operations; (2) indirect participation, namely military activities linked to combat, such 
as scouting, spying, sabotage, use of children as decoys, couriers or military 
checkpoints, bringing supplies to the frontline; gathering information, transmitting 
orders, transporting ammunition and foodstuffs, or acts of sabotage; (3) support 
functions, such as food deliveries to an airbase or the use of domestic staff in an 
officer’s accommodation, and (4) ‘girls recruited for sexual purposes and forced 
marriage’.95 
The Commentary on the APs acknowledges some ambiguity of the expression ‘direct 
participation’ in API’s guarantee that ‘Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by 
this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.’ 96 
However, it appears that customary international humanitarian law prohibits 
‘participation in hostilities’ encompassing both direct and indirect acts that affect the 
enemy forces. 97  An alternative approach towards interpreting the notion of 
‘direct/active participation’ in hostilities in API is to refer to the travaux preparatoires 
of the International Criminal Court Statute, which recognises ‘conscripting or enlisting 
children under the age of 15 and using them to participate actively in hostilities’ as a 
war crime. The definition of ‘participation’ advanced in the travaux covers many 
activities and ‘is therefore not limited to taking direct part in combat or deployment to 
                                                 
94 Byron, C. (2012). Legal Redress for Children on the Front Line: The Invisibility of the Female Child. 
In C. M. Bailliet (Ed.), Non-state Actors, Soft Law and Protective Regimes. Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press; Quenivet, N. (2008). Girl Soldiers and Participating in Hostilities. African 
Journal of International and Comparative Law, 16, 219-235.   
95 This language is taken from the Cape Town Principles and Best Practices, adopted at the Symposium 
on the Prevention of Recruitment of Children into the Armed Forces and on Demobilization and Social 
Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Africa. (1997). Retrieved from 
https://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/Cape_Town_Principles(1).pdf 
96 International Committee of the Red Cross. (2016). Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: 
Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field (2nd ed.), paragraph1679.  
97 The operation of a weapon and participation in combat obviously fall within the ambit of this 
definition. The ICRC has advanced the position that, since the intention of the drafters of the article was 
clearly to keep children under fifteen outside armed conflict, indirect participation in international armed 
conflict should also be ruled out. See Quenivet (n 94), 228. 
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the frontlines’; the activities of girls in military-related activities such as scouting, 
spying, sabotage, and the use of children as couriers fall within the remit of the 
proscription and those using them can be prosecuted for doing so. By contrast, 
according to the travaux, activities ‘unrelated to the hostilities such as food deliveries 
to an airbase [or] the use of domestic staff in an officer’s married accommodation’98 
would not qualify as participation in the hostilities.  
In addition, the cognate question emerges of whether sexual abuse of girl soldiers by 
their own forces – what the Cape Town Principles addressing child soldiers refer to as 
‘girls recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriage’99 – can be understood to 
constitute direct or indirect participation. To the extent relevant soft law guides policy 
and programming for child soldiers, they adopt broad definitions. The 1997 Cape Town 
Principles, emerging from a UNICEF meeting of policy experts, use an encompassing 
definition. Notably, instead of defining participation in armed conflict, it focus on ‘child 
soldiers’, describing them as: 
Any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular 
armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, 
porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family 
members. It includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriage. It 
does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms.100 
This definition embraces a broader interpretation than the provisions of international 
humanitarian, criminal and human rights law, as it covers many tasks that are related to 
the hostilities but that are not aiming at causing harm to the opponent, even indirectly. 
Further, the Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces 
or Armed Groups (2007), which may more legitimately lay claim to ‘soft law’ status as 
the agreed outcome of a meeting of states, introduces the term ‘child associated with 
an armed force or armed group’:  
A ‘child associated with an armed force or armed group’ refers to any person 
below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an armed 
force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys 
and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual 
                                                 
98 Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Draft 
Statute and Draft Final Act (14 April 1998) UN Doc. A/Conf.183/2/Add. 1, footnote 12.  
99 Cape Town Principles (n 95). 
100 Ibid.   
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purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taking or has taken a direct part 
in hostilities.101 
Nevertheless, this broad definition constitutes a weak norm, given its legal basis in ‘soft 
law’ consensus documents. Further, to the extent that the principles engage established 
legal categories, they reiterate existing criteria of direct and indirect participation. Thus, 
operative paragraph 6 of the Paris Principles specifically employs the expression 'used 
them to participate actively in hostilities,' attesting that participation must take an active 
form.102  
Interestingly, the definition of child recruitment and use in the Security Council’s 
thematic activities on children and armed conflict is apparently not limited to 
international humanitarian law or international criminal law. Rather, the definition of 
recruitment and use adopted by the Security Council Resolution 1539 refers to a 
broader legal regulatory frame than either IHL or International Criminal Law (ICL): 
Requests the Secretary-General to attach to his report a list of parties to armed 
conflict that recruit or use children in violation of the international obligations 
applicable to them, in situations that are on the Security Council’s agenda or 
that may be brought to the attention of the Security Council by the secretary-
General, in accordance with Article 99 of the Charter of the United Nations, 
which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and 
security; 103 
The very general definition offered in the Resolution 1539 arguably places greater 
emphasis on the operational activity of those empowered to monitor the resolution’s 
compliance, as it would give rise to a de facto definition of child soldier recruitment 
and use. Looking across IHL, ICL and thematic activity of the UNSC, we see some 
significant doctrinal variation in the definition of child soldiers and prohibited 
activities.  
 
  
                                                 
101 Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups, 
February 2007, https://www.unicef.org/emerg/files/ParisPrinciples310107English.pdf.  
102 Quenivet (n 94). 
103 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1539 (emphasis added)).  
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The Prohibition of Sexual Violence against Civilians in Conflict 
The term ‘conflict-related sexual violence’ (CRSV) is increasingly popular in 
scholarship104 and policy-making.105 One broad definition of CRSV that is commonly 
utilised comes from the United Nations Secretary-General as ‘sexual violence 
occurring in a conflict or post-conflict setting that has a direct or indirect causal link 
with the conflict itself’.106 CRSV includes manifestations of violence that may reach 
the tactic of war threshold107 as well as sexual violence against civilians within the 
wider context of the conflict. CRSV can be individual and collective, and the harms 
that ensue are physical, moral, emotional, social, immediate, and intergenerational.108 
Acts falling within the definition of CRSV include rape, forced pregnancy, forced 
sterilization, forced abortion, forced prostitution, trafficking, sexual enslavement, and 
forced nudity.109 This broad definition, however, is not strictly legal. It does not align 
with the regimes under scrutiny. As the section elucidates, the regimes differ in the acts 
that constitute sexual violence and in how the relationship to conflict is determined.  
Under IHL, parties to conflict are bound by the interrelated core principles that are 
relevant to the conduct of any armed conflict, namely the obligation to distinguish 
between civilians and combatants and target only the latter. While civilians cannot be 
targeted, all harm to civilians is not prohibited. Rather such harm must accord with 
                                                 
104 See especially Swaine (n 81). 
105 See, for example, UN Women. (2010). Addressing Conflict-related Sexual Violence: An Analytical 
Inventory of Peacekeeping Practice; UN Department of Political Affairs. (2012). Guidance for 
Mediators: Addressing Conflict-related Sexual Violence in Ceasefire and Peace Agreements.  
106 United Nations Secretary-General, Representative of the Secretary-General on the Implementation 
of Security Council Resolutions 1820 (2008) and 1888 (2009) (24 November 2010) UN Doc. A/65/592-
S/2010/604, paragraph 5.  
107 Eriksson Baaz, M., and Stern, M. (2013). Sexual Violence As A Weapon Of War? Perceptions, 
Prescriptions, Problems In The Congo And Beyond. London and New York: Zed Books, 45-46. 
108 See Representative of the Secretary-General (n 6), paragraphs 5, 8.5. See also United Nations 
Secretary-General, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: Representative of the Secretary-General (13 
January 2012) UN Doc. A/66/657-S/2012/33 (discussing implementation of United Nations initiatives 
and providing information on continuing violations). 
109 United Nations Action Against Sexual Violence in Conflict. (2011). Analytical and Conceptual 
Framing of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, http://perma.cc/D97Z-YJDC, 1. 
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principles of proportionality110 and precaution in attack.111 In addition, methods and 
means of combat should not cause ‘unnecessary suffering’.112 In terms of the regime’s 
definition of sexual violence, critics argue that IHL does not prohibit sexual violence 
in a sufficiently robust manner, leaving the prohibition largely implied, rather than 
explicit.113 Broadly speaking, rape is expressly prohibited,114 while the prohibition of 
other forms of sexual violence is encompassed in less explicit provisions such as the 
prohibitions against cruel treatment and torture, outrages upon personal dignity, 
indecent assault and enforced prostitution, and those intended to ensure respect for 
persons and honour.115 In contemporary IHL treaties, rape and other forms of sexual 
violence are prohibited in both international and non-international armed conflicts. 116 
Two additional provisions protect specifically women ‘against rape, enforced 
prostitution and any other form of indecent assault’117 and children ‘against any form 
of indecent assault’.118 
In addition to establishing the presence of conflict, and the occurrence of sexual 
violence, a further critical element is required to amount to a violation of IHL. Even 
                                                 
110 A party is required to forego any offensive where the incidental damage expected ‘is excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated’. See International Committee of the 
Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule 14. 
111.Ibid, Rule 97. 
112 This principle of ‘humanity’ stipulates that civilians and those who are hors de combat must be 
treated humanely: any killing, torture, rape, mutilation, beatings, humiliation, and similar abuses are 
prohibited. In addition, methods or means of combat should not cause ‘unnecessary suffering’. The 
International Court of Justice has defined unnecessary suffering as ‘harm greater than that unavoidable 
to achieve legitimate military objectives’. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory 
Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, paragraph78. 
113 See, for example, Gardam, J. (1993). The Law of Armed Conflict: A Gendered Regime? Studies in 
Transnational Legal Policy, 25, 171-201.   
114 As early as the Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (Lieber 
Code). 24 April 1863, article 44.  
115 Gaggioli, G. (2014). Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts: A Violation of International Humanitarian 
Law and Human Rights Law. International Review of the Red Cross, 96(894), 503-538, 511-517. 
116 In international armed conflicts, Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War, 12 August 1949 (GCIII), article 14. The Fourth Geneva Convention is more explicit and provides 
that civilian ‘women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular against 
rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault’. GCIV, article 27. API provides that 
‘outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, enforced prostitution 
and any form of indecent assault’, are ‘prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever, whether 
committed by civilian or by military agents’. API (n 88), article 75(2)(b). 
117 API , ibid, article 76(1) 
118 Ibid, article 77(1). 
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when committed in times of armed conflict, sexual violence is not necessarily an IHL 
violation. The term ‘conflict-related sexual violence’ is not used in IHL treaties. Rather, 
the term conflict ‘nexus’ is used in IHL. This is a complex area, in which there has been 
significant (and ongoing) jurisprudential development,119 sufficed to explain for the 
purpose of the paper by means of the following example: 
In the context of a non-international armed conflict, if a military commander 
rapes a subordinate soldier in a military barracks as a form of punishment – as 
he may have done already in peacetime – without this act having any link to the 
armed conflict situation, IHL would not apply to the act. On the other hand, in 
the same armed conflict, if the military commander rapes a person detained for 
reasons connected to the armed conflict, such an act clearly constitutes a 
violation of IHL (and human rights law). The nexus derives from a number of 
elements here: the identity of the perpetrator (a military commander), the 
identity of the victim (a person detained for reasons related to the armed 
conflict), and the context (situation of vulnerability of detainees to the Detaining 
Power).120 
Under ICL, historically, while it has long been accepted that crimes of sexual violence 
are contrary to the laws of war121 and customary international law, the foundational 
statutes remained silent on the status of rape as a war crime or a constitutive act of 
crimes against humanity. Nevertheless, the early jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tribunals 
determined these questions definitively. In a series of landmark judicial developments 
of international criminal law, rape was held to constitute a grave breach of the Geneva 
Conventions, constitutive of a crime against humanity and genocide.122 The Rome 
Statute codified these developments and went beyond them by explicitly recognizing 
rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, pregnancy and sterilization and other forms 
of sexual violence as crimes against humanity and as war crimes.123  
                                                 
119 For an overview, see van der Wilt, H. (2012). War Crimes and the Requirement of a Nexus with an 
Armed Conflict. Journal of International Criminal Justice, 10(5), 1113–1128. 
120 Gaggioli (n 115), 515.  
121 Chinkin, C. (2009). Gender-related Violence and International Criminal Law and Jurisprudence. In 
A. Cassese (Ed.), Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice. Oxford and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 76, confirmed by Delalic and others (IT-96-21) TJ (16 November 1998), paragraph 
145.  
122 For an overview of jurisprudential developments, see Gaggioli (n 115). 
123  Rome Statute (n 59), articles 7(1)(g), 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi). Further, the forced marriage 
jurisprudence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, a hybrid court with elements of domestic and 
international jurisdiction, in which the Prosecutor argued that the ‘bush wife’ phenomenon – the capture 
of women who were then ‘married’, forced to have sex with their abductors and to bear their children – 
was not adequately captured by offences such as rape or enslavement., leading to the later indictment of 
forced marriage as a crime against humanity, Consolidated indictments of AFRC and RUF, Special Court 
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ICL requires a conflict-nexus in order to establish that a war crime has occurred. The 
question of conflict nexus has been extensively litigated, but is defined to broad 
acceptance by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
Appeals Chamber in the Kunarac case. The Appeals Chamber confirmed that what 
distinguishes a war crime from, for example, a purely domestic criminal offence is the 
armed conflict ‘environment’ in which it is committed. The conflict must have been 
important to the perpetrator’s ‘ability’, ‘decision’, ‘manner’ or ‘purpose’ to commit the 
crime. Ultimately, if the perpetrator ‘acted in furtherance of or under the guise of the 
armed conflict’, that would establish the necessary nexus.124 The Appeals Chamber 
went on to identify a number of factors to determine whether or not an alleged offence 
is sufficiently related to the armed conflict to constitute a war crime. These factors 
included:  
the fact that the perpetrator is a combatant; the fact that the victim is a non-
combatant; the fact that the victim is a member of the opposing party; the fact 
that the act may be said to serve the ultimate goal of a military campaign; and 
the crime is committed as part of or in the context of the perpetrator’s official 
duties.125  
Along the lines of the ad hoc tribunal case law, the ICC Elements of Crimes provide 
that for a war crime to exist, it must be committed ‘in the context of and associated 
with’ an armed conflict.126 The wording ‘in the context of’ refers to the existence of an 
armed conflict, and ‘associated with’ refers to the nexus requirement. Conflict-related 
sexual violence must thus be committed by a person (whether combatant or civilian) in 
the context of and associated with an armed conflict in order to amount to a war crime 
under the Rome Statute. Ultimately, the determination is made on a case-by-case basis. 
It is clear that this conflict nexus requirement mitigates against the broad definition of 
‘conflict-related sexual violence’ now prominent in relevant policy-making and 
                                                 
for Sierra Leone, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT (under the rubric of ‘other inhumane acts’). Special Court 
for Sierra Leone Statute, article 2(i). See further Gekker, E. (2014). Rape, Sexual Slavery, and Forced 
Marriage at the International Criminal Court: How Katanga Utilises a Ten-Year-Old Rule but Overlooks 
New Jurisprudence. Hastings Women's Law Journal (Winter), 105-133. 
124 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac and Others, Case No. IT-96-23and23/1 (Appeals Chamber), 
12 June 2002, paragraph 58. 
125 Ibid, paragraph 59. 
126 See, for instance, International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, article 8(2)(a)(i)-1. 
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advocated in much feminist literature. Indeed, this conflict nexus requirement has been 
a key line of feminist critique in international criminal law.127 
The Security Council, also, has been prominent in advancing a norm prohibiting sexual 
violence in armed conflict. Resolution 1820 was adopted in 2008 and it marked the first 
time the Security Council noted that sanctions could be imposed on parties to an armed 
conflict in order to protect women from sexual violence. The Council denounced rape 
as a tactic of war used to intimidate, disperse, or forcibly relocate members of a 
community or ethnic group and expressed the possibility of imposing targeted sanctions 
against parties ‘who commit rape and other forms of sexual violence against women 
and girls in situations of armed conflict.’ 128 The Security Council has not specifically 
defined sexual violence—it refers to the targeting of civilians, including women and 
children, for ‘rape and other acts of sexual violence’ or ‘sexual and gender-based 
violence.’ In practical terms, Resolution 1960 (2010) established standardised 
monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangements (MARA) to provide ‘systematic, 
timely, reliable, and objective information on conflict-related sexual violence to the 
Security Council’. MARA reporting informs the listing of parties to conflict credibly 
suspected of committing or being responsible for rape and other forms of conflict-
related sexual violence in the UN Secretary-General’s report on sexual violence in 
armed conflict to the Security Council, which can in turn underpin inter alia the 
imposition of sanctions.129 
The prohibition of the recruitment and use of child soldiers is clearly established under 
international humanitarian law, international criminal law and under relevant thematic 
activity by the UN Security Council. Likewise, sexual violence against civilians, in 
particular rape, is clearly prohibited across the three regimes.130 Where these norms are 
less clear, however, is the combatant or civilian status of ‘girls recruited for sexual 
purposes and forced marriage’ and in the precise legal treatment of sexual violence 
                                                 
127 See, for example, Swaine (n 81). 
128 The language of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820 (2008) was repeated in United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1888 (2009), paragraph 19, United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1960 (2010), 7; and United Nations Security Council Resolution 2106 (2013), 13.  
129 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1820. 
130 This literature and primary legal sources are too extensive to cite comprehensively, but see generally 
Gaggioli (n 115).  
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perpetrated against child soldiers. As the remaining sections reveal, these definitional 
questions around the boundaries of the norm prohibiting the recruitment and use of 
child soldiers and the norm prohibiting sexual violence against civilians in armed 
conflict raise practical challenges for the institutions of international law charged with 
the implementation, monitoring and enforcement of these norms.  
 
GROUNDING INTERNATIONAL NORMS: INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONAL ACTIVITY ON SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST GIRL 
SOLDIERS IN THE DRC 
Sexual Violence and Girl Soldiers in the DRC 
The DRC has one of the highest rates of child soldiers in the world, with an estimated 
30,000, constituting 12 per cent of the global total of child soldiers. Although there is 
abundant evidence that girls are recruited and used by armed groups in the DRC in very 
large numbers – girls are estimated to represent up to 40 per cent of these children131 – 
many continue to be invisible. Indeed, the global literature on girl soldiers reveals that, 
until relatively recently, the term child soldier meant a 'boy soldier'.132 In the DRC 
context, this underrepresentation of girls is due to a variety of reasons.133  Girls are 
frequently considered by armed group commanders as dependents, as their roles in the 
group as ‘wives’ or concubines is not considered by their recruiters as making them 
eligible for formal reintegration processes, which is where most children are separated 
from armed groups and documented.134 Therefore, the typically reduced visibility of 
girl soldiers can be attributed to the different and gendered roles they perform in armed 
groups. Whereas boys are more often engaged in direct combat and bodyguard duties 
                                                 
131 MONUSCO. (2015). Invisible Survivors: Girls in Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo from 2009 to 2015. Retrieved from https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/invisible-survivors-girls-
armed-groups-democratic-republic-congo-2009-2015. 
132 Tonheim (n 84), 19. More recent reporting by MONUSCO estimates that between 30% to 40% of 
all children recruited to armed groups are girls, based on evidence from hundreds of witnesses 
interviewed. In 2009 alone the percentage of girls released from armed groups was 7% of the total, 
compared to 8% in 2014, indicating a small improvement over the reporting period. GoDRC and child 
protection partners should devise strategies to reach a target of at least 15% by the end of 2016. 
MONUSCO, ibid. 
133 This discussion is taken from MONUSCO (n 131). 
134 Ibid. 
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for commanders, girls are typically involved as domestic servants to individual 
commanders and responsible for food preparation for entire armed groups.135 Further, 
there is widespread evidence of sexual violence and forced marriage between these girls 
and male soldiers.136  
 
Institutional Activity under International Humanitarian Law 
The most commonly identified weakness of international humanitarian law concerns 
its institutional structures and enforcement procedures. Grounded in a principle of 
reciprocity between armed actors, the regime operates without an effective monitoring 
body or enforcement procedure. According to the Geneva Conventions and APs, three 
enforcement procedures attend international humanitarian law, namely ‘protecting 
powers’, international fact-finding commissions and prosecutions. Yet third states are 
always reluctant to become formally involved. The API establishes an ‘International 
Fact-Finding Commission' which has to date never been activated. 137 Consequently, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in practice plays a unique role in 
promoting compliance with IHL on the ground in conflict-affected settings, often with 
a large and well-resourced country presence.  
The ICRC is a critical institutional actor for understanding the relationship between 
international gender equality norms and women’s and girls’ rights in conflict-settings. 
Its activities fall into three broad categories, all of which implicate the protection of 
gender equality norms in conflict. First, the ICRC is expressly authorised under IHL to 
provide humanitarian assistance to wounded and sick combatants and civilian 
populations, subject to the consent of the parties to the conflict.138 Thus, while IHL 
                                                 
135 Ibid. 
136 Ibid. 
137 API (n 88), article 90. Cassese, A. (2014). Current Challenges in International Humanitarian Law. 
In A. Clapham and P. Gaeta (Eds.) The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict. Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 13. 
138 GCI, article 9. The same text is replicated across articles 9, 9, 9 and 10 of GCI, II, III and IV, 
respectively. Further, Common Article 3 provides that an ‘impartial humanitarian body, such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer is services to the parties to the conflict’. Under API, 
the ICRC ‘may also carry out any other humanitarian activities in favour of these victims, subject to the 
consent of the parties to the conflict’. See also International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary 
International Humanitarian Law, Rule 124B.  
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imposes an obligations on parties to conflict concerning civilian access to humanitarian 
aid, in circumstances in which belligerent actors are failing to meet these obligations, 
the ICRC negotiates with the parties on matters relating to the supply of food for the 
civilian population: safe access to fields and crops, safe passage of food convoys, 
security of food assistance operations. 139  Second, the ICRC engages in protection 
activities, which is analogous to a monitoring role, but also involves direct 
representations to weapons bearers to encourage the cessation of named IHL 
violations.140 The ICRC engages in a highly confidential dialogue with targets in an 
attempt to rectify violations of IHL. Third, the ICRC engages in IHL promotion 
activities.  It issues public interpretations of the law and actively supports new rules in 
many areas. The ICRC thus regards itself as the ‘promoter and guardian of international 
humanitarian law’.141 The ICRC promotes IHL by educating state and non-state armed 
groups about implementing IHL through legislation, military manuals, and training.142 
In its education and training of participants in armed conflicts, the focus is on 
translating the norms of IHL (regardless of the state’s ratification status or domestic 
law) into doctrine, operational policies, and rules of engagement. The ICRC thus 
grounds its mandate in the Geneva Conventions. 
Across its roles, we can see evidence of institutional autonomy, control of expertise and 
a pedagogic role as a ‘teacher’ of norms in the ICRC’s country office. Its presence in 
the Congo is long-standing, since 1978. Its mandate reflects the broader threefold ICRC 
mandate of assistance, protection and promotion. In terms of its control of expertise, 
the ICRC’s more abstract doctrinal discussions of IHL maintain that domestic chores 
and sexual services of girl soldiers do not constitute ‘participation’ as prohibited under 
customary IHL.143 The ICRC instead invokes the protections attached to civilians and 
the ‘special care’ afforded to children under IHL to underpin the prohibition of 
                                                 
139 International Committee of the Red Cross (n 33), 85.  
140 Ibid, 26.  
141 Ratner, S. R. (2011). Law Promotion Beyond Law Talk: The Red Cross, Persuasion, and the Laws 
of War. European Journal of International Law, 22(2), 459-506. 
142 See further, Kellenberger, J. (2014). The Role of the International Committee of the Red Cross. In 
A. Clapham and P. Gaeta (Eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Law in Armed Conflict. Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press, 20-36.  
143  International Committee of the Red Cross. (2011). Guiding Principles for the Domestic 
Implementation of a Comprehensive System of Protection for Children Associated with Armed Forces 
or Armed Groups. 
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enslavement and sexual violence against civilian girls, as distinct from categorising 
girls subjected to this treatment within armed groups to be girl soldiers.144  
In its country-specific activities in the DRC, the ICRC gives little express prominence 
to the relatively weak gender equality norms that address girl soldiers. From a review 
of published statements of the ICRC’s activity in the DRC, it seems clear that gender-
sensitivity on, in particular, child soldiers is not prioritised. Drawing on its annual 
reports, ICRC activities on child soldiers first emerged as constituent of its overall work 
on restoring family links impacted by the conflict – thus its assistance mandate – but 
with little clear evidence of gender-sensitivity.  Much of the activity focused on 
unaccompanied children.145 As the years unfolded, more dedicated activities around 
child soldier reintegration and preventing their re-mobilisation emerged, including 
direct representations to armed groups to prevent re-mobilisation.146 Child soldiers 
frequently featured as subject of confidential representations to armed groups, 147 
including representations to the national army, the FARDC.148 However, nowhere do 
reports of this work indicate any deliberate gender-sensitivity in its child soldier 
activity. For example, the 2006 annual report is the first time that gender-disaggregated 
figures are provided on the number of unaccompanied minors registered by the 
delegation, but the number of former child soldiers is not gender-disaggregated.149  
The ICRC has an express pedagogic role through its promotion activities. For example, 
the delegation established links with leaders of some armed groups in North and South 
Kivu, distributed to them educational materials aimed at ending sexual violence against 
                                                 
144 Ibid. Nevertheless, in its policy prescriptions for the reintegration of former child soldiers, the ICRC 
adopts the broader category of CAAFAG, which clearly includes this latter group of activities and 
thereby evidencing norm reinforcement in a practical sense. 
145 In 2001, the ‘persisting problem’ of child soldiers was expressly noted in an annual report, as an IHL 
violation, but also by way of disaggregating what number of unaccompanied children were former child 
soldiers. In 2001, the ICRC in cooperation with the national society registered its first group of 225 child 
soldiers who had been demobilised. International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 2001, 77.  
146 International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 2002, 63.  
147 International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 2003, 57; International Committee of the 
Red Cross, Annual Report 2006, 87; International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 2009, 
122; International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 2015, 135.  
148 For example, International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 2006, 87.  
149 Ibid, 88. 
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women, and conducted dedicated sessions on ‘addressing sexual violence’. 150 
Critically, its confidential engagements and public IHL promotion activities address 
state security forces, UN forces and non-state armed groups and militias about their 
obligations under IHL and their conduct in violation of IHL in respect of sexual 
violence and child soldiers. The confidential nature of these engagements means that 
their detail is unclear, beyond the broadest possible statement of, for example, number 
of educational seminars given to particular actors in a given year. Importantly, the 
reports strongly suggest that, in its engagement with armed actors – in particular non-
state armed groups – the ICRC emphasises the ‘main principles of IHL’ 151 (most 
critically, the principle of distinction) 152 over precise detail (for example, whether 
domestic chores constitutes ‘participation’ in armed groups, or whether sexual violence 
against members of one’s own forces can constitute a war crime). Thus, while its 
abstract statements of IHL observe formal distinctions between direct and indirect 
participation by girl soldiers, in its active teaching activities, considerably greater 
flexibility in the law is evident. This flexibility and ‘pragmatism’ has led some 
observers of the ICRC to observe that Geneva Law is as far from country office 
activities as the country office is from Geneva.153 
Further, the ICRC is also a ‘teacher of norms’ in less overt ways. The ICRC is the 
international institution doing the difficult and essential work of engaging directly with 
‘weapons bearers’ in pursuit of improved compliance with IHL. In terms of its 
protection mandate, the 2003 ICRC annual report is the first time sexual violence is 
mentioned as an IHL violation in the DRC, in the context of the East of the country,154 
leading to confidential representations to relevant authorities to reduce the incidence of 
rape.155  The discursive and material strategies by which international institutions praise 
                                                 
150 Ibid, 90.  
151 International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 2009, 124.  
152 International Committee of the Red Cross, Public Statement 2008, to all belligerents to protect 
civilians, issued after renewed fighting in the Kivus. The Annual Report 2008 noted that confidential 
dialogue ‘was instrumental in ensuring safe access to conflict-affected civilians’, International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 2008, 100.  
153 Forsythe, D. (2005). The Humanitarians: The International Committee of the Red Cross. Cambridge 
and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
154 International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 2003, 56. 
155 International Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 2006, 87. For example, International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Annual Report 2007, 97: ‘Dialogue was strengthened with armed groups 
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and denounce, reward and sanction, certain behaviours are evident in the ICRC’s 
protection activities. The ICRC makes confidential representations to weapons bearers 
regarding past or ongoing violations. The ICRC’s confidential representations remain 
confidential unless the confidential dialogue is not improving the treatment of IHL 
violations, in which case the ICRC will engage with other actors, such as third-party 
governments, international organisations and NGOs, in order to cultivate other 
influences on conflict parties. Failing that, public criticism either of the quality of 
dialogue with a particular belligerent actor, or specifically naming IHL violations, is 
the last resort of the ICRC and only activated in a minority of situations.156  
The focus on the institutional activities of those charged with monitoring and enforcing 
women’s rights in armed conflict has brought useful insights from the case study of the 
ICRC in the DRC conflict. First, it is clear that the boundaries and limitations of the 
country delegations’ activities are not necessarily determined by either its strict legal 
mandate or IHL more broadly, thus evidencing the organisation’s significant 
institutional autonomy from its role as defined in the Geneva Conventions. The 
evidence is that strict IHL distinctions regarding definitions of ‘participation’ and 
various child soldier activities have limited impact on the ICRC’s activities on the 
ground in their engagement with armed actors. Second, the relatively weak norms 
regarding gender-sensitivity in responding to child soldiers had little apparent impact 
on ICRC country activities.  Third, in terms of its pedagogic role, the case study 
suggests that the ICRC dialogue with the state, non-state armed groups and local 
communities using ‘humanitarian’ language and projects is valuable currency for the 
realisation of gender equality and security on the ground.  
 
Institutional Activity under International Criminal Law 
It is, at least in part, the weakness of the monitoring and enforcement procedures 
attached to international humanitarian law that has underpinned extensive feminist 
                                                 
and FARDC, and allegations of IHL violations… including sexual violence made known to them so that 
they could bring such abuses to an end’. 
156  International Committee of the Red Cross. (2005). Doctrine 15, Action by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross in the event of violations of international humanitarian law or of other 
fundamental rules protecting persons in situations of violence, International Review of the Red Cross, 
87(858), 393-400. 
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focus, engagement and legal development under international criminal law. 
International criminal law has offered a means to respond to widespread impunity for 
the most serious violations of international humanitarian law. Moreover, through the 
existence of formalised criminal tribunals, international criminal law has offered clear 
institutions to target advocacy and intervention. Feminist actors have frequently been 
to the forefront of calls for prosecutions for international crimes.157 Thus a strong anti-
impunity norm was given significant impetus with the entry into force of the Rome 
Statute establishing the International Criminal Court, though the boundaries of that 
norm continue to evolve.  
The autonomy of the ICC is most apparent in the role of the Office of the Prosecutor 
(OTP). The OTP is formally independent. The Prosecutor has the authority to act propio 
motu on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.158 
Efforts to constrain this autonomy at the Rome Statute negotiations were largely 
unsuccessful, with the exception that the Security Council can by resolution defer an 
investigation. In addition, it can be argued that the Office of the Prosecutor plays a 
monitoring role through its mandate to consider all credible evidence of wrongdoing in 
order to determine whether authorisation should be sought from the Court to proceed 
to an investigation. 159  To this end, the Prosecutor is authorised to seek further 
information from states, UN organs, national and international non-governmental 
organisations and any other credible source.160  
The ‘complementary jurisdiction’ of the ICC has heightened the role of the OTP in 
terms both of its control of expertise and its pedagogic function. The ICC’s 
complementary jurisdiction over international crimes, including sexual violence in 
armed conflict and the recruitment and use of child soldiers, means that it can only 
exercise jurisdiction where the state party has been shown to be ‘unwilling or unable’ 
to conduct domestic prosecutions.161 In practice, the Office of the Prosecutor operates 
                                                 
157 See, for example, Copelon, R. (1994). Surfacing Gender: Re-engraving Crimes Against Women in 
Humanitarian Law. Hastings Women's Law Journal, 5(2), 243-266. 
158 Rome Statute (n 5959), article 13.  
159 Ibid, article 15(2).  
160 Ibid, article 15(2). See further International Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor. (2013). Policy 
Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation.  
161 Rome Statute (n 59), article 17.  
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quite publicly about the countries either being considered for preliminary examination 
and under examination, thereby prompting further scrutiny of those conflict-settings.162 
The Informal Expert Paper on Complementarity advocates two underpinning 
principles, namely partnership (with national jurisdictions) and vigilance. 163  The 
principle of ‘vigilance’ speaks to the Office of the Prosecutor’s monitoring role:  
The Prosecutor must be able to gather information in order to verify that national 
procedures are carried out genuinely. Cooperative States should generally 
benefit from a presumption of bona fides and baseline levels of scrutiny, but 
where there are indicia that a national process is not genuine, the Prosecutor will 
take follow-up steps, leading if necessary to an exercise of jurisdiction.164  
It is, in the first instance, the OTP who determines whether genuine efforts are being 
made by states to investigate alleged international crimes and to correspond with states 
as to further appropriate actions to satisfy the OTP’s requirements.  
The OTP’s unique role and independence casts the office as critical to translating 
international anti-impunity norms into criminal accountability for specific violations of 
women’s and girls’ rights in conflict. The OTP’s high profile role therefore made the 
failure to specifically include charges for sexual violence in the first indictment issued 
by the Court in the Lubanga case all the more disappointing to gender justice advocates. 
Instead, the charges were confined to the recruitment and use of child soldiers. The 
indictment therefore marked an important development in the anti-impunity norm 
against the recruitment and use of child soldiers, as the first such indictment by any 
international criminal tribunal. Nevertheless, it meant that the question of whether the 
forced involvement of girls in domestic or sexual roles in armed groups constituted 
‘participation’ for the purposes of prosecuting the recruitment and use of child soldiers 
became central to the case. The Court ultimately concluded that it did not, despite an 
intervention arguing the contrary from the UN Secretary-General’s Special 
Representative on Children in Armed Conflict. While hugely disappointing for the 
many victims failed by the prosecution’s strategy, the Court’s finding was broadly 
consistent with established categories of IHL and ICL at the time.  It did pose a 
                                                 
162 See, for example, the Colombian case: Urueña, R. (2017). Prosecutorial Politics: The ICC's Influence 
in Colombian Peace Processes, 2003-2017. American Journal of International Law, 111(1), 104-125.   
163 International Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor. (2003). Informal Expert Paper: The Principle 
of Complementarity in Practice (2003), paragraph 1.  
164 Ibid.  
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concerted challenge, however, to many feminist advocates in international criminal law 
who relied on judicial autonomy – specifically, judicial development of the law – to 
criminalise new and newly-recognised gender harm.165  
In the Court’s second foray into the DRC conflict, namely the prosecution of Bosco 
Ntaganda, the Court had the opportunity to revisit the precedent established in 
Lubanga.166 On this occasion, confirmed charges specifically included, inter alia war 
crimes of rape and sexual slavery against girl soldiers within Ntaganda’s own ranks. 
Throughout the prosecution, from Confirmation of Charges to the Appeals Chamber, 
the Defence argued that the Court could not have jurisdiction over the crimes allegedly 
committed within Ntaganda’s forces, because war crimes cannot be committed against 
combatants from the same armed forces as the perpetrator. Such crimes, the Defence 
argued, would come within the ambit of domestic criminal law and human rights, but 
were not covered by the war crimes prohibition.  
Illustrating the unclear boundaries of the norms against sexual violence and against the 
recruitment and use of child soldiers, the Court addressed the question in different ways 
at each level. The Pre-Trial Chamber found that ‘[t]he sexual character of these crimes, 
which involve elements of force/coercion or the exercise of rights of ownership, 
logically preclude active participation in hostilities at the same time’.167 Therefore, the 
Chamber concluded that children fighting in Ntaganda’s forces who had been sexually 
abused remained under the protection of IHL and, consequently, it could exercise 
jurisdiction over those crimes.168 Trial Chamber VI’s decision took a rather different 
approach, by determining that the prohibition of rape had attained jus cogens status 
under international law. Consequently ‘such conduct is prohibited at all times, both in 
times of peace and during armed conflicts, and against all persons, irrespective of any 
                                                 
165 See, for example, Chinkin (n 121), discussing the role of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
jurisprudence.  
166 On 9 June 2014, three pre-trial judges of the Court confirmed charges against Ntaganda and found 
substantial grounds to believe that military groups under Ntaganda’s command committed war crimes in 
the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo from 2002-2003. The 13 charges against Ntaganda 
include, inter alia: murder, attacking civilians, rape, sexual slavery of civilians and child soldiers under 
the age of fifteen years and using them to participate actively in hostilities, and five counts of crimes 
against humanity. 
167 Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute 
on the Charges, ICC-01/04-02/06, Pre Trial Chamber II, 9 June 2014, paragraph 79. 
168 Ibid, paragraph 80.  
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legal status’,169 and that it did not, therefore, need to determine whether the victims 
were ‘members’ of the armed forces at the relevant time.170 This decision, however, 
was confined to the crime of rape and did not apply to other forms of sexual violence.  
Ultimately, the approach of the Appeals Chamber was to prove even more dramatic in 
its implications. The Appeals Chamber unanimously confirmed the Trial Chamber’s 
judgment, however expanding the initial judgment in some significant respects. The 
Appeals Chamber determined that members of an armed force or group are not 
categorically excluded from protections against the war crime of rape and sexual 
slavery 171  when committed by members of the same armed force or group. 
Nevertheless, it must be established that the conduct in question ‘took place in the 
context of and was associated with an armed conflict’ of either international or non-
international character. ‘It is this nexus requirement that sufficiently and appropriately 
delineates war crimes from ordinary crimes.’172  Therefore, according to the Court, the 
victims of war crimes of rape and sexual slavery need not be ‘protected persons’ (i.e. 
civilians) under IHL.173 On this basis, the Appeals Chamber concluded, the question of 
child soldiers’ membership of the group while victims of war crimes was now moot.174 
                                                 
169 Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Decision on the Defence's challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court 
in respect of Counts 6 and 9, ICC-01/04-02/06, Trial Chamber VI, 9 October 2015, paragraph 51. 
170 Ibid, paragraphs 52-53.  
171 Under Rome Statute (n 59), article 8(2)(b)(xii) and (2)(e)(vi). 
172 Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Ntaganda against the “Second 
decision on the Defence’s challenge to the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of Counts 6 and 9”, ICC-
01/04-02/06 OA5, Appeals Chamber, 15 June 2017, paragraph 2. 
173 Ibid, paragraph 51. 
174 Ibid, paragraph 69. The Appeals Chamber then went onto consider whether status requirements exist 
under ‘the established framework of international law’: paragraph 56. They concluded that, while there 
was no precedent for applying grave breaches scheme to victims of own forces, there was no reason it is 
precluded: paragraph 60. The Appeals Chamber then expressly departed from the precedent of Special 
Court for Sierra Leone that ‘the law of international armed conflict never intended to criminalise acts of 
violence’ against own forces: paragraph 61. In conclusion, the Appeals Chamber found no reason to 
‘introduce’ status requirements to article 8(2)(b)(xxii) and (e)(vi) of the Statute on the basis of the 
‘established framework of international law’: paragraph 66. ‘The Appeals Chamber appreciates the 
seemingly unprecedented nature of this conclusion’ (paragraph 67).  
The Appeals Chamber emphasises in this context that Elements of Crime for each war crime 
contains an express nexus requirement which must be established in each particular instance. 
Therefore, in the Appeals Chamber view, it is the nexus requirement and not the status requirement 
that sufficiently distinguishes war crimes from ‘ordinary’ crimes. [The nexus requirement would] 
prevent undue expansion of the reach of the law of war crimes. (paragraph 68)  
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At one level, the extraordinary decision of the Appeals Chamber, in effectively 
upending the distinction between combatants and civilians in cases of sexual violence 
connected to conflict, is simply yet another example – albeit dramatic – of judicial 
development of international criminal law. To draw on Krook and True’s analysis, it 
constitutes an example of dynamic norms that evolve in response to the external 
normative environment. For those primarily concerned with securing criminal 
accountability for sexual violence, the Appeals Chamber made a positive step by 
convicting Ntaganda for all crimes of sexual violence against members of his own 
forces.175 In this vein, Rosemary Grey opined after the Appeals Chamber decision: 
It is a sign of the gender blindness of IHL and ICL that until now, it was not 
clear whether the sexual abuse of children by members of their ‘own’ armed 
group can, in fact, be a war crime. 
By answering that question in the affirmative, the ICC Appeals Chamber has 
made an enormously important contribution to international criminal law.176 
At another level, however, in a litany of contested jurisprudence, the decision of the 
Appeals Chamber in Ntaganda stands out as the most controversial. Instead of being 
the primary vehicle for enforcing IHL, ICL now stood to challenge its key tenets. 
Throughout its decision in Ntaganda, the Appeals Chamber inaugurated a potentially 
very significant norm conflict that would ultimately lead others to question both the 
ICC’s control of expertise and its pedagogic role towards state parties. IHL lawyers 
responded with grave concern. For example, Kevin Jon Heller admonished the Court 
for its ‘legally indefensible’ conclusion that risked ‘delegitimising both the Court and 
the law of war crimes itself’.177 Implications of the judgment include that, under the 
Rome Statute, raping members of own armed forces is a war crime but murdering them 
is not. In addition, as not all forms of sexual violence are prohibited under jus cogens, 
according to Appeals Chamber logic they would not be a war crime if committed 
                                                 
175 See, for example, Deuitch, S. T. (2016). Putting the Spotlight on the Terminator: How the ICC 
Prosecution of Bosco Ntaganda Could Reduce Sexual Violence during Conflict. William and Mary 
Journal of Women and Law, 22, 655-688, 685. 
176 Grey, R. (2017). ICC Appeals Chamber issues ‘unprecedented’ decision on war crimes of rape and 
sexual slavery. 14 June https://ilg2.org/2017/06/14/icc-appeals-chamber-issues-unprecedented-
decision-on-war-crimes-of-rape-and-sexual-slavery/  
177 Heller, K. J. (2017). ICC Appeals Chamber Says A War Crime Does Not Have to Violate IHL. 
Opinio Juris, 15 June http://opiniojuris.org/2017/06/15/icc-appeals-chamber-holds-a-war-crime-does-
not-have-to-violate-ihl/   
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against own forces.178 Heller concluded that, not only did the International Criminal 
Court get it wrong again, but also the decision risked undermining the very fabric of 
international humanitarian law.179  
This sort of norm conflict is unlikely to enhance understanding or compliance with the 
core IHL principle of distinction between civilians and combatants and the obligation 
not to target civilians. From the viewpoint of prosecuting individuals who recruit and 
use children in hostilities, broadening the threshold of ‘participation’ is positive. 
However, under IHL, those people (including children) who meet the criteria for direct 
participation may be attacked for the duration of that participation.180  If the Court’s 
understanding of ‘active/direct’ participation under the Rome Statute is overly broad, 
the protection available to girls associated with armed groups as civilians narrows 
accordingly. Definitional problems between IHL and ICL create unnecessary 
ambiguity as to the relationship between the Court’s understanding of the active/direct 
concepts under the Rome Statute and treaty provisions of IHL. The result is that 
targeting a civilian engaged in scouting, sabotage or guarding military objectives 
(among other things) would be illegal under the Rome Statute but permitted under IHL. 
Uncertainty as to which regime might govern the action of parties to a conflict creates 
greater potential for impunity and greater likelihood for tensions between the pedagogic 
activities of institutions under IHL and ICL. The potential for uneven gender outcomes 
is clear.  
 
Institutional Activity under the United Nations Security Council 
In institutional terms, the comparative advantage of the Security Council in the 
protection of gender equality norms in conflict lies squarely in its unique enforcement 
authority. Under the UN Charter, the Security Council has a range of robust responses 
it can engage to threats to international peace and security, up to and including the use 
                                                 
178 Diab, N.I. @NaderiskDiab ‘also not all forms of sexual violence are jus cogens so according to AC 
logic they would not be a war crime.’16 June 2017, 9.17AM. Tweet. 
179 Heller (n 177). 
180 Beringola, A. M. (2016). Ensuring Protection of Child Soldiers from Sexual Violence: Relevance of 
the Ntaganda Decision on the Confirmation of Charges in Narrowing this Gap. Amsterdam Law Forum, 
8(2), 58-68, 62. 
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of force.181 Since the emergence of the Children and Armed Conflict and the Women, 
Peace and Security thematic agendas at the Security Council in 1999 and 2000, 
respectively, there has been considerable activity to improve alignment between gender 
equality norms in conflict and the Security Council’s activation of enforcement 
measures. Efforts towards norm alignment have manifested clearly in the mandates of 
peacekeeping missions, in the imposition and monitoring of sanctions, and in the 
broader role and significance of mechanisms to ‘list’ perpetrators of sexual violence in 
armed conflict and violators of children’s rights in armed conflict in relevant annual 
reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council. The listing procedure operates 
with considerable autonomy from state interests, while the direct interaction with 
conflict parties through monitoring and agreeing action plans involves a direct 
pedagogic role.  
Resolution 1612 (2005) established a monitoring and reporting mechanism (MRM) to 
monitor the recruitment and use of child soldiers182 (the so-called ‘listing’ mechanism, 
whereby known perpetrators of child soldier recruitment and use are listed in the annex 
to the Secretary General’s annual report on Children and Armed Conflict). Resolution 
1612 also established a Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict to review 
situations on the Secretary-General’s annexes, assess progress made in action plans and 
make specific recommendations to the Council and other relevant bodies for action.183 
The final critical expansion of monitoring activities under the Children and Armed 
Conflict Agenda came in Resolution 1998 in 2011, which added five other grave 
violations of children’s rights in armed conflict to inform the Secretary-General’s 
listing activities, namely: killing and maiming, sexual violence, abductions and forced 
displacement, denial of humanitarian access, and attacks against schools and 
hospitals.184 The relative autonomy of these listing procedures is evidenced in, for 
example, the inclusion of the UK – a Security Council permanent member – in the 2012 
                                                 
181 For Security Council powers, see Charter of the United Nations (24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI, 
Chapter VI and Chapter VII.  
182 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1612 (2005), paragraph 2. 
183 Ibid, paragraph 8.  
184 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1539 (2004). 
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report and the listing of post-demobilisation criminal gangs in Colombia, against the 
express opposition of the Colombian government.185 
The Secretary-General’s reports and listings that address inter alia the DRC suggest a 
definition of child soldier recruitment and use that includes all of the following 
elements (1) direct participation in combat; 186  (2) indirect participation, namely 
military activities linked to combat, such as scouting, spying, sabotage, use of children 
as decoys, couriers or military checkpoints, bringing supplies to the front line, gathering 
information, transmitting orders, transporting ammunition and foodstuffs, or acts of 
sabotage;187 (3) support functions, such as food deliveries to an airbase or the use of 
domestic staff in an officer’s accommodation,188 and (4) ‘girls recruited for sexual 
purposes and forced marriage’,189 though inconsistently so. While the listing procedure 
therefore demonstrates the institution’s control of expertise, the Security Council has 
nevertheless been criticised for using an unclear and inconsistent definition of 
recruitment and use of child soldiers to inform the ‘listing’ mechanism.190 Questions 
are raised therefore as to the clarity of the norms being ‘taught’ through this process.  
                                                 
185 See further O’Rourke, C. (2019). Women’s Rights in Armed Conflict under International Law. 
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.  
186 See, for example, United Nations Secretary-General, Representative of the Secretary-General on 
Children and Armed Conflict, UN Doc. S/2006/389; United Nations Secretary-General, Representative 
of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, UN Doc. S/2007/391; United Nations 
Secretary-General, Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, UN Doc. 
S/2010/369; United Nations Secretary-General, Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and 
Armed Conflict, UN Doc. S/2014/453. 
187 See, for example, United Nations Secretary-General, Representative of the Secretary-General on 
Children and Armed Conflict, UN Doc. S/2006/389; United Nations Secretary-General, Representative 
of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, UN Doc. S/2010/369; United Nations 
Secretary-General, Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, UN Doc. 
S/2014/453.  
188 See, for example, United Nations Secretary-General, Representative of the Secretary-General on 
Children and Armed Conflict, UN Doc. S/2010/369; United Nations Secretary-General, Representative 
of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, UN Doc. S/2014/453.  
189 See, for example, Report of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General on Children and 
Armed Conflict, UN Doc. S/2006/389; United Nations Secretary-General, Representative of the 
Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, UN Doc. S/2007/391; United Nations Secretary-
General, Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict, UN Doc. S/2008/693; 
United Nations Secretary-General, Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and Armed 
Conflict, UN Doc. S/2010/369; United Nations Secretary-General, Representative of the Secretary-
General on Children and Armed Conflict, UN Doc. S/2014/453. 
190 Waschefort, G. (2015). International Law and Child Soldiers. Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 
162. 
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To illustrate, it is unclear from the listing of DRC parties to conflict whether sexual 
violence against girl soldiers is to be treated as a grave violation of sexual violence 
against children or a grave violation as the recruitment and use of child soldiers. This 
has practical implications as, to date, almost all of the action plans have been related to 
stopping recruitment and use of children as soldiers, which was the only trigger for 
getting on the Secretary-General’s Annexes until 2009. There have been no action plans 
on stopping sexual violence against children, although the Afghanistan action plan on 
stopping recruitment includes an annex on sexual violence, and the DRC action plan 
on stopping recruitment includes references to sexual violence.191  The substance and 
precise contours of the norms being ‘taught’ are therefore unclear and potentially 
problematic.  
In terms of the Security Council activities on Children and Armed Conflict, norm 
incoherence also carries practical consequences for the mandate of UN forces in the 
DRC. Most significantly, Resolution 2098 (2013) established the ‘Intervention 
Brigade’ to ‘neutralise’ listed armed groups and to reduce the threat of sexual and 
gender-based violence and child soldier recruitment and use posed by armed groups.192 
This move by the Security Council thereby extended the peacekeeping mandate to 
include an offensive military component and was without precedent. While this new 
departure for UN peacekeeping was avowedly taken on in the pursuit of civilian 
protection, including the rights of women and girls, this active combat role for the UN 
presents acute challenges to its thematic agendas and internal norm coherence. Active 
combat increases the likelihood of UN forces engaging in hostilities with forces that 
contain child soldiers. Once a child engages in hostilities, she or he is targetable by 
opposition forces, as is the case with any other soldier or fighter.193 In their terms of 
engagement, it is unclear whether UN forces adopt the narrower IHL definition of 
‘active/direct participation’ or the Security Council’s apparently (though 
inconsistently) broader definition in order to determine whether girls recruited for 
                                                 
191 Thompson, S. K. (2014). Children and Armed Conflict. In J. Genser and B. Stagno Ugarte (Eds.), 
The United Nations Security Council in an Age of Human Rights. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 108.  
192 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2098 (2013), paragraph 9. 
193 Waschefort (n 190), 194. 
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sexual purposes and forced marriage’ are legitimate targets. The norm inconsistencies 
may already carry very grave consequences indeed.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Fragmentation is a pressing concern in international legal scholarship. The specific 
gender implications of fragmentation have, however, been unexamined to date. 
Normative and legal developments in the protection of gender equality in conflict have 
proliferated in recent decades across diverse regimes of public international law. While 
celebrated for bringing political priority and the potential of legal enforcement to the 
rights of women and girls in conflict, the ultimate impact of such norms on domestic 
conflict-affected settings is unclear. This article has sought to redress this gap in two 
distinct ways. First, the article revealed international institutions as key actors in the 
translation of fragmented gender equality norms into practice on the ground in conflict-
affected settings due to their institutional autonomy, control of expertise and pedagogic 
function. Second, through a case study of international institutional activity to prohibit 
sexual violence against girl soldiers in the DRC, the article revealed the role of 
international institutions not only in implementing international norms, but in fact in 
constituting them – often in a conflicting manner – through their operations. 
The extent to which the institutions examined in fact demonstrated autonomy, control 
of expertise and pedagogic function varied between institutions. The ICRC is the 
autonomous institution and teacher of norms par excellence. The ICC’s autonomy and 
control of expertise appeared, by contrast, more circumscribed and more vulnerable to 
challenge, in particular where its control of expertise seemed unclear and unconvincing. 
Thus, ostensible alignment between norms and institutional activities appears important 
for institutions to maintain their significance. Finally, for the Security Council, 
institutional autonomy was more obvious in its pedagogic function in teaching norms 
to states subject to monitoring than in its internal activities.  
Ultimately, the findings confirm the broad thesis that institutions are not just 
implementers of international norms, but in fact constitute the substance of norms 
through their activities, sometimes in contradictory ways. Therefore international 
institutions operating in conflict-affected settings are an important focus of empirical 
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study, especially in order to understand the relationship between international norms 
and institutional practices in conflict-affected settings.  
